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Human Rights and Imposed Constitutions
MARK W. JANIS*
Are there advantages in imposing constitutions on nations? Or are
such impositions wrong as a matter of international law, unwise as an in-
strument of national policy, and useless in terms of achieving desired re-
sults? This Article is an exploration of these questions from the perspec-
tive of human rights advocacy, especially the promotion of democracy and
the rule of law. It is a response to part of an Article, Imposed Constitution-
alism, by Professor Noah Feldman.'
Professor Feldman acted as an adviser during the recent imposed con-
stitutional process in Iraq, first independently and then for the Coalition
Provisional Authority in Baghdad. Now reflecting on that process in his
Article, he explores the contributions of three influential pressure groups in
the United States-(i) neoconservatives interested, inter alia, in a Middle
East with new constitutional regimes securing the region for Israel, (ii)
human rights advocates interested, inter alia, in new Middle Eastern con-
stitutional regimes promoting women's rights, and (iii) evangelicals inter-
ested, inter alia, in new constitutional regimes protecting rights to spread
Christianity. Professor Feldman critiques all three pressure groups and
their aspirations and concludes that, at the end of the day, all three groups
are likely to be overly optimistic about the likelihood of creating an im-
posed constitutional regime in Iraq that will effectively protect the different
interests the Americans are asserting. Nonetheless, he believes that impos-
ing constitutionalism is not entirely a bad thing, arguing that if some Iraqis
become committed to constitutionalism, good things can result over time.
One of his principal, albeit curious, historical examples, the imposition of
the Fourteenth Amendment on the South after the American Civil War,
took about a century to work. Such a time frame will be discouraging for
American neoconservatives, human rights advocates, and evangelicals
alike. In this commentary, I focus only on one aspect of Professor
Feldman's argument, the part that relates to advocacy for human rights
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while imposing constitutions.
To start with a definition of "imposed constitutionalism." Professor
Feldman does not provide one. Of course, the term is richer for its ambigu-
ity, but I think we might say, for working purposes, that by "imposed" we
might mean that "constitutionalism" may be imposed either by a conqueror
of a nation on a nation or by a conqueror of a nation on a nation with some
degree of consent of the conquered nation (or at least by the elite of a con-
quered nation) or by an international or multilateral organization on a na-
tion with or without the consent of the conquered nation (or its elite) or by
a majority of a nation on the minority of a nation or by the elite of a nation
on the non-elite of a nation. And, by "constitutionalism," I think we might
mean either a written constitution or a constitutional system of government
including its political and social institutions or a sort of government where
a special place is held by certain institutions. Here I, for one, would espe-
cially pick out a powerful judicial system, capable, perhaps with the aid of
judicial review, of limiting democratic decisions made, ordinarily, by legis-
latures, parliaments, or assemblies. When we question the wisdom of "im-
posing constitutionalism" on Iraq, I think we are asking for a specific an-
swer to a very useful general question: "When should a system of govern-
ment, especially a government that is meant to be more or less a democ-
ratic government governed by the rule of law, be imposed on an at least
somewhat unwilling nation?"
In defining his second assertive group, the "International Human
Rights Movement," Professor Feldman calls it "really a congeries of or-
ganizations with disparate interests and approaches, unified by a deep and
sincere commitment to spreading and implementing the fundamental guar-
antees of human liberty and equality embodied in international declarations
and conventions. '"2 I suggest that Professor Feldman's first and second
clauses are contradictory. Groups that are "unified by a deep and sincere
commitment to spreading and implementing the fundamental guarantees of
human liberty and equality embodied in international declarations and con-
ventions" seem to me to be a much closer grouping than Professor Feldman
implies when he calls them "really a congeries of organizations with dispa-
rate interests and approaches." Perhaps his sentence taken as a whole is
meant to signal a disdain or disappointment that Professor Feldman has
with the human rights movement. Indeed, I think that his word "congeries"
is meant to be mocking, an inference supported by his next sentence, where
Professor Feldman finds it "an interesting, if explicable, feature of this
movement that even though international documents like the U.N. Charter
speak of self-government and free political institutions as desiderata, its
commitments to basic rights has typically emphasized individual humani-
tarian rights over rights of political participation-in other words, rights to
2 Id. at 867.
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electoral democracy."3 This critique, denigrating human rights advocates
because they appear to Professor Feldman to be insufficiently committed to
the promotion of democratic governments, is well off the mark. Here, it
seems, his understanding is just as wobbly as his argument about the rele-
vance of the adoption and implementation of the Fourteenth Amendment in
the United States to Americans imposing a constitution on Iraq. Both no-
tions show a quick draw approach to comparison that are certainly colorful,
but historically doubtful. Let me add a little to Professor Feldman's state-
ments about human rights advocacy by turning to the example of Western
human rights advocacy and the "imposition" of new constitutional regimes
in central and eastern Europe.
Between 1945 and 1989, during the Cold War, we in the West assumed
(I would say usually rightly) that the Communist governments of central
and eastern Europe were imposed governments that were by and large nei-
ther democratic nor based on the rule of law, hence not really "imposed
constitutional" governments. Our assertion, along with our assertion of
Western economic superiority and its benefits, was that freed from Com-
munist imposition, the nations of central and eastern Europe would natu-
rally become both democratic and governed by the rule of law and that the
populations of these nations would be thus better off. Our Western claims
for democracy and rule of law in central and eastern Europe were thor-
oughly interwoven. Indeed, our interwoven "constitutional" assertion was
popularly known as a claim for greater "human rights" for the nations of
central and eastern Europe. As such, it could and did gather support in the
West both from those committed, post-Nuremberg, to international human
rights law in general and from those who, though they might not ordinarily
be advocates of international human rights, were nonetheless ready to use
human rights arguments to upset Communist regimes.
After 1989, the United States and western Europe prodded the central
and eastern European states towards democratic/rule of law constitutional
governments, but I do not think most Americans or western Europeans
would say that we "imposed constitutionalism" on the new governments of
central and eastern Europe to anywhere near the same extent as the Soviet
Union had imposed undemocratic/non-rule of law governments on them
between 1945 and 1989. Still, to a degree at least, Western human rights
advocacy did "impose constitutionalism" on many of the new governments
of central and eastern Europe after 1989, but it was an "imposition" so far
much more successful in practice than American "imposition" of constitu-
tionalism on Iraq. There are, of course, many differences between the two
impositions, but some lessons may well be drawn from the recent experi-
ence in central and eastern Europe that could be instructive to those pres-
ently "imposing constitutionalism" in the Middle East.
3 Id. (internal citations omitted).
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For me, the most important lesson here is that the "imposed constitu-
tionalism" in central and eastern Europe post-1989 was "imposed constitu-
tionalism" that was more "international" in several senses of the word. By
"constitutionalism" let me adopt and narrow the definition fashioned
above: either a written constitution or a constitutional system of govern-
ment including its political and social institutions or a sort of government
where a special place is held by certain institutions, such as a relatively
powerful judicial system. By "international" I mean it in two senses. First,
"international imposed constitutionalism" is imposed, at least in part, nei-
ther by a conquering power nor by an elite or a minority of a nation on the
rest of the nations, but by a process of multilateral diplomacy, international
law, and international institutions. Second, "international imposed consti-
tutionalism" may be, though not necessarily be, a kind of constitutionalism
that promotes and protects international human rights law. Of course, the
two may be related since the processes of multilateral diplomacy, interna-
tional law, and international institutions pressing for constitutional democ-
racies governed by the rule of law aim, among other things, to achieve na-
tional constitutional orders that promote and protect international human
rights law.
In the first sense of "international imposed constitutionalism," the most
important international constitutional pressure put upon the emerging states
of central and eastern Europe was that of the Council of Europe and its
Strasbourg system of European Human Rights Law, probably the world's
greatest success story in the effective enforcement of international human
rights law.4 The Council of Europe dates to 1949 and the European Con-
vention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
was open for signature in 1950. The idea that an international human
rights court could "trump" the final judgment of a sovereign state's highest
court was, of course, unthinkable in Europe at first, as it still is in the
United States today, but European Human Rights Law slowly but surely
accomplished the feat of emerging as an international tribunal that could
effectively challenge the final rulings of national sovereign legal systems.
The emergence of the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg
as an effective international constraint on member state law and policy
began in a small way in the 1970s, two decades after its establishment, as
the Strasbourg Court began an assertive invasion of state sovereignty with
a series of judgments boldly checking the human rights abuses of the
Council's member states with crucial decisions against some of the most
important states in the system-the United Kingdom, France, Germany and
Italy. Lawyers, encouraged not only by the boldness of the Court but by
the willingness of the member states to comply with adverse judgments,
again as unthinkable in Europe sixty years ago as it remains unthinkable in
4 MARK JANIS ET AL., EUROPEAN HuMAN RIGHTS LAW: TEXT AND MATERIALS (2d ed. 2000).
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the United States today, brought more and more cases to Strasbourg.
Hence, the Strasbourg Court's work load increased: from no judgments in
the 1950s, to an average of one a year in the 1960s, to two to three judg-
ments a year in the 1970s, to about seventeen a year in the 1980s, to about
ninety a year in the 1990s, and to about 700 a year in the 2000s.' From
1989, when the Berlin Wall fell and the central and eastern Europe nations
began to free themselves from Communist rule, membership in the Council
of Europe and in the Strasbourg human rights system expanded from
twenty-two states to forty-six states today.6 So in addition to the "deepen-
ing" of the system in western Europe, the new "widening" of the system to
central and eastern Europe has also, though so far to a lesser degree, con-
tributed to Strasbourg's burgeoning case law.
Importantly, the twin benefits of western Europe-protection of human
rights and economic prosperity-were explicitly intertwined by the western
Europeans as they welcomed (or not) the newly independent governments
of central and eastern Europe to the European fold. It was made clear from
the beginning that a prerequisite for entry into the European Union and its
promise of economic well-being was the prior institution of constitutional
governments based on the twin principles of democracy and rule of law.
Moreover, one important measure that constitutional governments had
passed the democracy and rule of law tests was admittance to the Council
of Europe and membership in the Strasbourg system of human rights law,
including the international supervision of human rights law within member
states by the Strasbourg Court. Thus, even for those in central and eastern
Europe who valued economic prosperity more than (or even to the exclu-
sion of) the protection of human rights, active and obedient participation in
the system of European Human Rights Law was mandatory. The Council
of Europe took an active role in the creation of new national constitutions
throughout central and eastern Europe because, in large measure, the west-
ern European governments insisted that the Council do so. If not, it would
be unlikely that a central or eastern European state could become a member
either of the Council of Europe or, eventually, of the European Union.7
This story of human rights advocacy in the imposition of constitutions
promoting democracy and the rule of law in central and eastern Europe is,
of course, a hopeful tale. Although the record of the new democracies in
central and eastern Europe is mixed, many of the new governments have
quickly become well-respected Western-style constitutional governments.
Moreover, ten new states were welcomed into the European Union in 2004,
5 Id. at 23-26.
6 See 1989 YEARBOOK OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 3 (1993) (listing the
twenty-two signatories to the Convention in 1989); COUNCIL OF EUROPE, ABOUT THE COUNCIL OF
EUROPE, at http://www.coe.intT/e/Com/about-coe/ (noting that there are currently forty-six members
of the Council of Europe) (last visited Mar. 25, 2005) (on file with the Connecticut Law Review).
7 Mark Janis, Russia and the 'Legality' of Strasbourg Law, 8 EUR. J. INT'L L. 93 (1997).
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demonstrating that they had passed their democracy and rule of law "tests"
as well as meeting the economic requirements for joining the Union; this
number included Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slove-
nia, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, all former Communist dictatorships.
From the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 to membership in the European
Union in 2004, only fifteen years had passed-an impressively rapid trans-
formation. Could there be similar hope for Iraq?
As optimistic as I would like to be, I recognize at least two problems.
The first problem Professor Feldman knows well-Iraqi society is not
European society and I simply do not know whether there is enough simi-
larity between the lay of the land in Iraq with the lay of the land in central
and eastern Europe to genuinely hope for a similar result. I could only say
that just as so many of us in the West were surprised at how quickly Com-
munism fell in central and eastern Europe, so we were again surprised at
how quickly democracy was established in many, if not all, of the old
Communist states.
The second problem is drawn from my understanding of why imposing
constitutionalism worked so well in central and eastern Europe after 1989.
Not only did the successful imposition of constitutionalism depend on the
character of the individual societies in the different nation states, but it
depended, I think, on the eagerness of the peoples, the elites, and the new
governments of these states to gain the economic prosperity promised by
integration in the European Union. Albeit, the European Convention on
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the European Court of Hu-
man Rights in Strasbourg were creations, not of the smaller European Un-
ion but of the larger Council of Europe. It was the European Union's re-
quirement that an applicant state maintain satisfactory participation in the
Council of Europe and the Strasbourg human rights legal system that was
an important carrot inducing the new governments in central and eastern
Europe to adopt and effectively implement democratic, human-rights-
promoting constitutions.
What, if anything, can be done to create a like inducement for Iraq?
Here are a few ideas tied into imposing constitutionalism, all admittedly
speculative. First, why not ask the United States and other Western gov-
ernments to encourage economic integration in the Middle East both for its
own sake, i.e., improving the prosperity of the region, and for the purpose
of requiring compliance with international human rights norms? Second,
why not ask the United States and other Western governments to encour-
age the creation of a human rights court for Iraq with judges drawn not
only from its Shi'ite, Sunni, and Kurdish populations, but also from the
international community? One could visualize, for example, a nine person
court composed of two members each from the three distinct peoples of
Iraq, and three international judges-an American, a European, and an
African, Asian, or Latin American. Third, why not ask the United States
[Vol. 37:955
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and other Western governments to work together to set up standards and
external mechanisms for supervising Iraqi compliance with international
human rights norms linked to economic incentives?

